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I.

II.

Scope of S Corporation Executive Under Compensation
A. 3,341,606 S Corporations for 2003 (latest Statistics ofIncome)l
B. In 2006, 60% of S corporations had a single shareholder; 89%, two or fewer
shareholders, and 94%, three or fewer shareholders. 2
C. For 2003 and 2004 combined GAO, based upon S Corporation National Research
Program (NRP) samples, estimates 887,000 S Corporations misreported
shareholder compensation in the aggregate amount of$23.6 billion; 15% of all 1
shareholder S corporations misreported shareholder compensation; 10% of 2-3
shareholder S corporations misreported shareholder compensation thus
underreporting wage taxes. 3
D. The wage tax gap as to such closely held S corporations providing professional
services is around $1 billion a year. This is around 18% of the wage tax gap for
all S corporations. 4
E. "The IRS should pursue the following additional issues in the NRP program. The
self-employment aspect of S-corporations is a very common planning issue, likely
to be associated with noncompliance." Tax Gap Analysis Subgroup Report (2008
IRSAC Report)
Government Studies and National Research Audits of S Corporation Executive
Under Compensation
A. NRP Wage Tax Audits
i. In February 2011 Janine Cook, branch 1 chief (employment tax), IRS TaxExempt and Government Entities Division, stated that 2,000 audits in the first
phase of the National Research Program had been under way for nearly a year
and IRS was looking forward to analyzing the information gleaned from the
program in order to more accurately pinpoint the causes of the tax gap. The
NRP Wage Tax Audits program, which is in effect from 2010 through 2012,
will include 6,000 comprehensive audits of large and small businesses, as well
as tax-exempt organizations, regarding payroll taxes, fringe benefits,
reimbursed expenses, executive compensation, and worker classifications.
Marie Sapirie, IRS Considering Formal Process for Worker Misclassification
Closing Agreements, 130 Tax Notes 1002 (Feb. 28, 2011); Sam Young, Official
Fleshes Out Details On Payroll Research Project, 2011 TNT .10~5 (Jan 14,
2011)(randomly select 2,000 taxpayers per year for three or more years; no
results from NRP will be announced until all examinations have ended; payroll
issues contribute more than $70 billion to the annual tax gap, approximately
twice as much as corporate tax issues); Sam Young, IRS Officials Discuss
Payroll Tax Research Initiatives, 2010 TNT 88-6 (May 7, 2011)("What we're

I Kelly Luttrell, S Corporation Returns, 2003, 25 STATISTICS OF INCOME (SOl) BULLETIN 94 (2005),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil03scorp.pdf; Joint Committee on Taxation Staff, Tax June 4,
2008)("Small Business and Choice of Entity").
2 Government Accountability Office, Tax Gap: Actions Needed to Address Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax
Rules 4 (GAO-I0-195 Dec. 9, 2009)("Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules").
3 Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules, supra note 2 at 13 Table 4 and 11 Table 2.
4 [d. at 10-11 and Table 2.
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calling a three-year study will probably take longer than three years."
Examinations of payroll returns will be comprehensive and address worker
classification, fringe benefits, executive compensation, and tip reporting.
Employers subject to the study include taxpayers under the purview of SB/SE,
the Large and Midsize Business Division, and the Tax-Exempt and Government
Entities Division); TIGTA, Limitations in the Sample Size for the Internal
Revenue Service's Employment Tax Study May Impact the Ability to Determine
Compliance Levels 3, 4 (2011-10-034 May 17, 2010 Final Report on May 17,
2011)( IRS selected the sample of employers to include in the Study based on
available resources; audit results for the sampled taxpayers may not enable IRS
management to fully estimate compliance levels for business taxpayers; IRS
management indicated that additional audits may be required after the Study is
completed to improve the IRS's estimates of business taxpayers' reporting
compliance). "[T]he IRS research team keeps track of trends in all tax areas. If
they see a trend developing over a period of a year or two, a division might be
asked to examine the returns through an audit, said Anita Bartels, program
manager for IRS's employment tax compliance policy." Liz White, IRS
Continues to Keep Close Watch on Audit Programfor Insight Into Tax Gap,
121 DTR G-3 (6/23/2011).
TIGTA, Limitations in the Sample Size for the Internal Revenue Service's
Employment Tax Study May Impact the Ability to Determine Compliance Levels
5,3: (2011-11-034 May 17,2010):
Percent of 2008,
.. Sample .. "

SB/SE Small Business/Self-Employed
TE/GE Tax Exempt Organizations I 2
TE/GE Government Entities13

1,500
535
9014

68.97%
24.60%
4.14%

LB&I Large Business & International

50

2.30%

Total.

, j .

"

2,175'<.

.100%

For 2008 over 5.5 million small businesses with employees represented 90% ofthe total employer
population and filed more than 85% of all employment tax returns, but large employers accounted
for over 45% of the total United States payroll. IRS plans to sample only 50 large/international
business taxpayers in each year of the Study, which may be too small ofa sample to provide
meaningful compliance estimates for these taxpayers.

B. 2010 Proposed Service Entity Legislation
i. Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation ofthe Revenue Provisions
Contained in the "American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of 2010, "for
consideration on thefloor of the House ofRepresentatives, 289-93 (JCX-29-10·
May 28,2010). The bill as part of the "pay for" as to the Extenders, passed
House in June 2010 but could not garner 51 votes in the Senate, would have
treated pro rata share of income of service provider (and related parties) in a
"disqualified S corporation" as self-employment income subject to SECA tax.
A "disqualified S corporation" was defined (1) an S corporation that is a
partner in a partnership engaged in a professional service business if
substantially all of the S corporation's activities were performed in connection
with the partnership, and (2) any other S corporation that is engaged in a
professional service business if the principal asset of the business is the
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reputation and skill of three or fewer employees. 5 An employee included an
individual who is considered an employee for Federal tax purposes, i.e., an
under-compensated professional S corporation shareholder-employee.
Under the provision, for SECA tax purposes, a shareholder's pro rata
share of S corporation income or loss under § 1366 attributable to the
professional service business included the pro rata share of each member of that
shareholder's family of such items of income or loss of the S corporation and
would have treated as self-employment income. This rule applied if the family
member does not provide substantial services with respect to th~ professional
service business. For this purpose, family members are an individual's spouse,
parents, children and grandchildren. 6
As under the present-law self-employment tax rules in the case of a trade
or business carried on by a partnership, certain items of income or loss would
have been excluded from net earnings from self-employment of an S
corporation shareholder under the provision, such as certain rental income,
dividends and interest, and certain capital gains and losses.
A professional service business for this purpose meant a trade or
business, substantiaUy all of the activities of which involve providing
services in the fields of health, law, lobbying, engineering, architecture,
accounting, actuarial sCience, performing arts, consulting, athletics,
investment advice or management, or brokerage services. Significantly this
limitation to "professional service business" omitted any other trade or business
where the principal asset was the reputation, or skill of three or less of its
employees.
Also the § 1402(a)(13) exclusion from SECA for a limited partner's
distributive share of partnership income or loss would not have applied to any
partner who provided substantial services with respect to a professional service
business in which the partnership is engaged.
1. OIi the Senate floor opponents to this provision criticized as to new terms
such as substantially all and attribution to skills or reputation, 7 but the
This reputation and skill approach had its origin in Joint Committee, Description and Analysis ofProposals
Relating to Worker Classification and the Tax Treatment of Certain S Corporation Shareholders 20 (JCX-6-94 May
2, 1994). The 1994 proposal noted that the common element to services firms "was that "the success of the business
is dependent upon the skills of ... [the professional] individual rather than the application of capital." Id. That
proposal defined "service-related business" as "any trade or business involving the performance of services in the
fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial services, performing arts, consulting, athletics,
financial services, brokerage services, or any trade or business where the principal is the reputation, or skill of one or
more of its employees."
6 Assume an individual owns 4% of the stock of an S corporation, and provides substantial services with respect to a
medical professional service business engaged in by a partnership in which the S corporation is a partner. The
individual's spouse, who provides no services with respect to the business, owns the other 96% of the S corporation
stock. Under the provision, the service-providing shareholder includes in net earnings from self-employment his
own pro rata share, and also the spouse's pro rata share of items of income or loss under §1366 attributable to the
rrofessional service business.
"[I]t will be very difficult to trace the hours of work for certain shareholders and link it back to the firm's revenues.
Lawyers and CP As can track their hours because that is how their businesses operate, but other service
professionals such as engineers and architects do not. ... also does not define what amount of participation in
professional services activities determines if one must pay the new tax. The House version says 'substantially all.'
The Senate version seems to suggest that even very limited participation in any of the activities listed under the new

5
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most extreme (and inaccurate) criticism was that the provision
"unnecessarily treats the income of 4 million small businesses organized

as S corps all as wages, which undermines the entire rationale for
having flow-through entities: to avoid the double taxation of
entrepreneur's income."g Actually for 2004, S corporation returns all
services industry sectors without regard to number of shareholders filed
31.26 percent of all of S corporation returns (and held only 11 percent of
all S corporation assets).9
2. Senator Max Baucus, D-Mont., then Senate Finance Committee Chair,
explained that it was "attempting to stop the abuses of some professional S
corps, the abuses they have been conducting. Frankly, they have been
paying themselves a very small salary. These are professional corporations
primarily. Then they pay themselves dividends. Because dividends are not
wages, they avoid payroll taxes. They avoid the FICA tax and avoid·
paying the Medicare tax. That is something we are trying to stop. The
substitute still addresses that abuse but in a way that is less burdensome to
bona fide S corporations."}O
3. An opponent declaimed: "My colleagues on the other side of the aisle call
this a "loophole closer" or an "anti-fraud provision...... None of us is in
favor of fraud, but that is not really what we are talking about. If the IRS
wants to improve compliance with the self-employment tax, they have the
right tools. They just need to use them. For example, the IRS Revenue
Ruling 74-44 that specifically addresses the tax treatment of dividends in
lieu of compensation gives them all they need ....... I also have pages·

and pages of case law of which the IRS has successfully litigated the
issue of dividends in lieu of compensation and the applicability of
employment taxes. Plus, Congress has codified the economic substance
doctrine which says a transaction must have an economic purpose aside
from the reduction of tax liability in order to be considered valid. In my
opinion, this is the IRS's ace-in-the-hole card. The IRS can close any
loophole-real or imagined-with the power of the new law.

definition of professional services would be SUbjected to the tax . Is that the intention? Finally, the family attribution
rules would appear to hit inactive family members who are solely shareholders and do not actively participate in the
day-to-day operations of the business by subjecting their investment income to payroll taxes." Remarks of Sen. Kyl,
R-Az, 156 Cong Rec S 5419 (June 24,2010).
8Id
9 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, FILING CHARACTERISTICS AND
EXAMINATION RESULTS FOR PARTNERSHIPS AND S CORPORATIONS 5 (2006-30-114 Aug. 28, 2006).
10 156 Cong Rec S 4972 (June 16,2010). See also Hearing before the Senate Finance Committee on Social
Security: Achieving Sustainable Solvency, S. Rep. No. 109-391, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (2005). In the May 2005
Senate Finance Committee Hearings, then Ranking Minority Member Senator Max Baucus, D-Mont., observed that
"[i]t looks like that many S corporations, particularly controlled by one shareholder, or two, are avoiding salaries to
avoid employment taxes. Why not correct that as part of the solution [to social security insolvency]?" Id. at 25.
Senator Ron Wyden, D-Ore., was "very troubled by the fact that a substantial number of extremely wealthy people
are not contributing their share on this Social Security matter. They are what I call the Social Security scofflaws.
That is what they are, Social Security scofflaws. I think Senator Baueus was dead right that you ought to go after
them ftrst." !d. at 29-30. (emphasis supplied).
.
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Why can't the IRS do its job with the volumes of legislative
regulatory and judicial tools it already has? For example, the IRS
revenue ruling could be codified somehow, but then it wouldn't provide an
offset for new programs, would it? Nor would it permit my colleagues
across the aisle to reduce the tax on venture capitalists for their carried
interest. I don't like the carried interest provision, but to soften the impact
of that policy on the backs of small businesses is just plain wrong.

Even the Government Accountability Office agrees the IRS should be
doing more with what it has to crack down on fraud. [emphasis added]
In a 2009 report, the GAO stated: "IRS efforts to enforce the rules on
paying adequate wage compensation to small business shareholders have
been limited," and the IRS provides only "limited guidance in determining
adequate compensation" guidelines for taxpayers. A 2002 report by the
Treasury's inspector ge~eral found that "IRS agents did not always address
officer compensation, even when little or no compensation was paid."
Clearly, the IRS isn't doing its job. That is the loophole. The IRS can and
should do more with what they already have." I I
4. Similarly the chief opponent, Senator Snowe, R-Me., argued "The
provision is aimed, as I have been told, at a specific abuse of the S corporations
wrapped in a partnership, which is a business format that allows a business
owner to inappropriately divert more money than is justified to nonsalary
distributions that are not subject to payroll taxes. Unfortunately, in order to
prevent this specific abuse, the authors had to write a very expansive anti-abuse
provision causing collateral damage to taxpayers who are not abusing the system
and imposing payroll taxes on retained earnings on small businesses. This is a
job killer, because retained earnings are the most reliable fonn of capital
available to small businesses. While there have been clear abuses of existing law
regarding reasonable compensation, it should be noted that the IRS successfully
prosecutes cases where business owners inappropriately divert salary income to
dividend distribution. In fact, the ruling as recent as May 27 of this year in David
E. Watson PC v. United States proves that the "reasonable compensation"
standard can be workable. Yet, it is not a clear bright line test that is either
easy for the IRS to enforce or for taxpayers to understand. That is why I
worked diligently, along with my staff, to find a way to address this abuse and
agree that if we could find a way to improve upon and make clearer the
"reasonable compensation" standard, we should do SO.12
ii. Joint Committee on Taxation, Description ofRevenue Provisions Contained in
the President's Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Proposal (JCS-3-2011 June 2011).
This professional services provision proposal was not included in President's
2012 Budget Proposals although companion revenue raiser as to Carried Interest
IS.

m. The bottom line is that a legislative cure is highly unlikely at the present time.

C. 2009 Government Accountability Office Report
1.

According to IRS data from the S Corporation NRP, about 68% of S
corporation returns filed for tax years 2003 and 2004 (the years data were

11

156 Congo Rec. S4972 (June 24, 2010)(Sen. Enzi, CPA); id. at S5240-41.

12

ld. at S5417.
5
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available) misreported at least one item. Some S corporations also failed to pay
adequate wages to shareholders for their labor for the corporation, which led to
underpayirig employment taxes. Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) reports show that
inadequate shareholder wage compensation is a significant issue. Using IRS
NRP data, GAO calculated that in the 2003 and 2004 tax years, the net
shareholder compensation underreporting equaled roughly $23.6 billion,
which could result in billions in annual employment tax underpayments.
Stakeholder representatives, IRS officials, and TIGTAhave indicated that
determining adequate shareholder compensation is highly subjective and
hinders compliance and enforcement. IRS provides limited guidance on
determining adequate compensation. Stakeholder representatives indicated that
specific IRS guidance for both new and existing S corporations could help
improve compliance. Additionally, IRS examiners often were not taking
advantage of certain techniques in examining shareholder compensation.
Analyzing a random sample of IRS examinations, GAO found that in cases
where IRS examiners did document a form of analysis, they were more likely to
make an adjustment than when no evidence of such analysis existed. Currently,
IRS does not require specific documentation of their analysis for shareholder
compensation by examiners. Legislative options exist to improve compliance
with shareholder compensation rules; however, these options also raise notable
trade-offs. Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules, supra note 2 at 2932 ..
S corporations must pay employment taxes on wage compensation paid to
officers and employees. S corporations may be tempted to pay shareholderemployees an inadequate wage and higher distributions to avoid employment
tax liabilities .. A single level of taxation, the ability to pass through business

losses to shareholders, and calculating employment taxes on wages rather
than net business income are the most significant tax-related reasons that
business owners elect treatment as an S corporation. For 2003-2004
887,000 S corporations misreported shareholder compensation. The net
misreported amount was $23,600,000 and the median was $20,127. Of the S
corporations misreporting S corporation shareholder compensation 93%
understated such compensation. Of the S corporations under stating officer
compensation 15% had 1 shareholder; 10%" 2-3 shareholders; and 4%" 4
or more. The difficulty and SUbjectivity in determining what constitutes an
adequate wage enables some S corporations to pay inadequate wage
compensation for the labor provided and compensate their officers through
higher amounts of distributions, payments of personal expenses, and/or loans.
According to NRP data for tax years 2003 and 2004, about 13 % of S
corporations paid inadequate wage compensation, resulting in just over $23.6
billion in net underpaid wage compensation to shareholders. To illustrate the
potential impact on employment tax revenue loss from paying inadequate
wages, GAO gu~sstimated $3 billion in employment tax revenue losses over tax
years 2003 and 2004. The vagueness of federal tax law on determining ad~quate
wage compensation for shareholders means that the facts and circumstances
6

have to be analyzed in each case. Doing so increases the burden for S
corporations to detennine adequate compensation and creates opportunities for
avoiding employment taxes by paying inadequate compensation.
Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules, supra note 2 at 26.
iii. Several IRS examiners told GAO that arriving at a justifiable conclusion about
what constitutes adequate compensation can be difficult, time consuming, and
result in a relatively low tax adjustment for the work involved. In detennining
adequate shareholder compensation, IRS examiners stated that they look at a
variety of factors. However, due to the difficulties in determining adequate

shareholder compensation, examiners said that they tend to only pursue
the issue in the most egregious cases where shareholders are paid little to
no wages and receive large distributions. A 2002 TIGTA report found that

IV.

IRS examiners did not always address officer compensation, even when little to
no compensation was paid. Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules,
supra note 2 at 27.
In analyzing IRS annual examination data for fiscal years 2006 through 2008,
GAO found that IRS only examined 0.5 % or less of the S corporations that

filed Form 1120S. IRS examined shareholder compensation usually in well
less than a quarter of these examinations over these years. In GAO's review
of randomly selected NRP examination files, it found evidence of some kind of
analysis to detennine adequacy in 24 of 114 examinations where IRS
detennined that shareholder compensation needed review. These analyses

included benchmarking tools such as monster.com, salary.com, and Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) wage data. In the other 90 examinations, examiners
did not document an analysis, and in some cases merely reconciled an officer's
W-2 fonn to the return. Examiners made adjustments in 10 of the 24 cases
where documentation showed that an analysis had been made and in 16 of the
other 90 cases. In these 26 examinations with adjustments due to inadequate
shareholder compensation, the adjustment amount averaged $30,000.
Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules, supra note 2 at 28-29.

D. NRP S Corporation Audits for 2003-2004 Returns
1.

Joint Committee on Taxation and TIGTA agree that the Service does not have
recently trained, revenue resources to audit and challenge under compensation
in the sole shareholder and majority controlled by a single shareholder S
corporation carrying on a trade or business (other than rental).13 The Inspector
General concluded that determining whatis reasonable compensation to pay a
business officeds complex and subjective. He earlier testified that since the

Service is forced to address the issue of reasonable officer compensation on
a case-by-case basis, many owners ofS corporations have apparently

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, THE NATIONAL RESEARCH
PROGRAM STUDY OF S CORPORATIONS HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED, BUT
UNNECESSARY INFORMATION WAS REQUESTED FROM TAXPAYERS 5 (2007-30-027 Jan. 30,2007);
2005 Senate Finance Hearing supra note 10 at 176 (Written statement of Chief of Staff George Yin) (enforcement
of reasonable compensation "rule by government may be difficult because it involves factual determinations
on a case-by-case basis.").
13

7

determined that saving employment taxes by minimizing salaries is worth the
risk of a Service audit. 14
iL The extremely low audit rates of S corporations and wage taxes for the last
decade or so with the decline accelerating from 1998 to 2004 with a recent
recovery of around 50% of that decline, but wholly through Correspondence
Audits tending to be largely ineffective as to high income taxpayers. IS
While this audit ratio is projected to increase, it still can cover only a
fraction of the S corporations engaging in officer under compensation.
iii. Joint Committee on Taxation and TIOTA agree that IRS does not have
recently trained, revenue resources to audit and challenge under
compensation in the sole shareholder and majority controlled by a single
shareholder S corporation carrying on a trade or business (other than
rental).16 that the 15,200 audits ofS co~orations for 2001 (the high water mark
for 2001-03 dropping to 9,695 by 2003 1 ) were not enough even to pick up the
14 2005 Senate Finance Hearing supra note 10 at 20 (testimony of Treasury mspector General for Tax
Admiriistration Russell George). Joirit Committee Chief of Staff George Yin agreed that
[t]here is an enforcement issue. Because under current law the requirement is based on reasonable
compensation. So, it is a question of, to what extent is that beirig well enforced. But that is a very difficult
line to enforce. So I would concur with Mr. George that, as our testimony suggested, that statutory changes
are needed, not just in the Subchapter S area, but in all of the other areas, the limited liability companies
and partnerships as well.
Id at 30.
15 See TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, WHILE EXAMINATIONS OF
HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS HAVE INCREASED, THE IMPACT ON COMPLIANCE MAYBE LIMITED 1-2
(2006-30-105 July 25, 2006)("The IRS conducts examiriations of taxpayer returns through two techniques: (l)
correspondence examinations are conducted by sending the taxpayer a letter requesting verification of certairi items
on the tax return and (2) office and field examiriations are conducted by examiners who hold face-to-face meetings
with taxpayers to verify information.); Hearing on A Closer Look at the Size and Sources o/the Tax Gap Statistics
Before the Senate Committee on Finance's Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight, S. Hearirig. No.1 09-1 004,
109th Cong., 2nd Sess. 84-5 Figs. 1 and 2, 159 (2007)(response to written question by Senator Kerry by TIGTA
Russell George)("It is probable that these types of examinations [correspondence audits] are irieffective for certain
types of taxpayers, which may include high-iricome non-filers. At the same time, severe penalties and aggressive
enforcement actions may be options to iricrease the response rate.")("SIZE AND SOURCES OF THE TAX GAP").
16 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, THE NATIONAL RESEARCH
PROGRAM STUDY OF S CORPORATIONS HAS BEEN EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED, BUT
UNNECESSARY INFORMATION WAS REQUESTED FROM TAXPAYERS 5 (2007-30-027 Jan. 30,2007).
17 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE
ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2006 10,40 Figure 39 (2007-30-056 Mar. 27, 2007) (After decliriing
75% from FYs 1998 to 2004, the numbers of Forms 1120S examined iricreased 63% in FT 2005 and another 34% in
2006. These increases are partly attributable to examiriations of Forms 1120S as part of an ongoing National.
Reseatch Project studying tax compliance. The study, carried out under the National Research Program (NRP),
examiried 5,000 randomly selected S corporation returns from tax years 2003 and 2004. Note that the percentage of
S corporation returns audited decreased even more that the number examiried and increased less in 2005 and 2006
due to the explosion of the number of S corporations. Examination Rates for S Corporation Returns (FYs 19962005):
Fiscal Year
Returns Examined
Coverage Rate
19,490
0.92%
1996
23,898 .
1997
1.04%
25,522
1998
1.04%
1999
21,169
0.81%
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entire 36,000 single shareholder-controlled S corporations reporting at least
$100,000 in business profits and paying no formal wages to officers. 18 While S
corporation audits increased 2006-2007 the audit coverage remained in the .4 to
.5 % range; and the number of S corporation compensation audits ranged from
2,000 to almost 4,000 being raised in 14 % to just over 20 % of the S
corporation audits. 19
Additionally, the low audit coverage rates of S corporations (lowest of the

taxable categories of returns in recent years) had been exacerbated by
auditors historically not always addressing officer compensation in audits
of S corporations showing distributions to shareholders.while reporting
little or no officer compensation?O More recently, GAO reports that the
Subchapter S Corporation NRP audits which did examine adequacy of
officer compensation "generally did not document much analysis of the
adequacy of the wages paid.,,21 In subsequent fiscal years 2006-2008 when
the percentage ofS Corporation returns audited ranged from 0.4 to 0.5 % the
percentage of such audits examining adequacy of officer compensation ranged
15,200
2000
0.55%
12,437
0.43%
2001
2002
11,646
0.39%
9,695
2003
0.30%
6,400
2004
2005
10,410
Sources: Treasury Inspector General for Tax Admimstratton analYSIS of IRS data. 2005 Senate Finance Hearing,
supra note I 0 at 63.
18 TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, FILING CHARACTERISTICS AND
EXAMINATION RESULTS FOR PARTNERSHIPS AND S CORPORATIONS 3, 11 (2006-30-114 Aug. 28,
2006). No change audits for 2004 had been 29.16%. Id. at II Fig. 7. Increase for 2005 "can be partly attributed to
examinations of Forms 1120S as part ofa Nation Research Project. Most of these examinations have been
completed." TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, TRENDS IN
COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2006 17 (2007-30-056 Mar. 27, 2007); TREASURY
INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION,TRENDS IN COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES
THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2007,39 Fig. 36. (2008-30-095 Apr. 18,2008»
19 Estimated Number of S Corporation Examinations with Shareholder Compensation Issues, Examinations Closed
in Fiscal Years 2006 to 2008.
2006
2007
2008
3,715,249 3,909,730 4,155,830
Number of S corporations filing Form 1120S
13,970
17,657
16,634
Number of S corporations examined
Number of S corporations examined for shareholder compensation
2,004
3,819
2,597
0.4
0.5
0.4
Percentage of all S corporations examined
21.6
Percentage of S corporation examinations that covered adequate compensation
14.3
15.6
Noncompliance WIth S CorporatIOn Tax Rules, supra note 2 at 28.
20 Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, The Internal Revenue Service Does Not Always Address
Subchapter S Corporation Officer Compensation During Examinations 2 (2002-30-125 Jul. 2002)("IRS classifiers
were unable to effectively identify and classify S Corporation officer compensation non-compliance because the IRS
computer systems capture limited tax return data on S Corporations. Also, better methods are needed to measure the
results of the IRS' efforts to address S Corporation officer compensation compliance. Finally, the Taxpayer
Education and Communication (TEC) function could improve its taxpayer outreach efforts regarding S Corporation
compliance.").
21Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules, supra note 2 at 28-29 (in random selection ofNRP files only 21 %
of examinations determining that shareholder compensation needed review contained evidence of same kind of
analysis).

9

from 13.3 to 15.6 %.22 This in the range of the 13 % ofS Corporation returns
paying inadequate compensation indicated by the 2003-2004 returns NPR
data. 2!

E. 2005 Senate Finance Committee Hearing
1. 2000 Statistics
1. 36,000 single-shareholder S-corporations with greater than $100,000 in
profits passed through total business profits of $13.2 billion without
paying any employment taxes. 24
2. The average S-corporation in this set made $366,666 in business profits
without paying any compensation to officers who rendered more than
minor services
3. 399,000 additional single-shareholder S-corporationswith less than
$100,000 in business profits also paid no compensation to their
shareholder, which shielded an additional $9.1 in profits from wage
taxes?5
4. These 435,000 single-shareholder S-corporations which paid no
shareholder compensation despite business profits make up about 21.9%
of all the 1,985,171 single-shareholder S-corporation. 26
5. Another 43,673 single-shareholder S corporations with $14 billion in
aggregate business profits paid between 1 and 9% of business profits as
compensation to shareholder officers.
6. Additionally, 89,332 single shareholder S corporations with $17 billion in
business profits paid between 10 and 19% of business profits as
compensation to shareholder officers.
7. Finally 92,307 single-shareholder S corporations with $17.5 billion in
business profits paid between 20 and 29% of business profits as
compensation to shareholder officers. In short, between 80 and 90% of
another $31 billion in shareholder compensation was not being reported
for wage tax purposes.
F. Joint Committee on Taxation
i. Tax Gap Options
22Id. at p.28, Table 7.
23Id. at 25.
24 2005 Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 10 at 19 (statement of Hon. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration).
25 Id at 45 "Variations in Salaries Selected by Owners of Single-Shareholder S Corporations (Tax Year 2000)"
(prepared statement of statement of Hon. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration) Total
business profits of single shareholder S corporations paying no compensation to officers for 2000 was $23.1 billion;
total number of such S corporations, 435. The bar graph indicates that this 399,000 S corporations with business
profits but paying no officer compensation break down roughly as follows: 280,000 reporting less than $25,000
accounted for $2 billion in the aggregate; the 80,000 reporting from $25,000 to $49,999, accounted for $2.8 billion
in the aggregate; and the 39,000 reporting from $50,000 to $99,999, accounted for $3.1 billion in business profits in
the aggregate. Thus, the 39,000 single shareholder S corporations reporting from $50,000 to $99,999 in business
profits accounted for 39% of the business profits of this category of single shareholder S corporations with less than
$100,000 in business profits while constituting only 10% of such corporations.
26 Determined by mUltiplying the total number of S corporation returns in 2000 (2,860,478), see Kelly Bennett, S
Corporation Returns, 2000,22 STATISTICS OF INCOME (SOl) BULLETIN 63, 115 tb1.5 (2003), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soilOOscorp.pdf, by the number of single-shareholder S corporations (69.4%).
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1. Proposal to treat returns on labor (but not on capital) for both materially
participating partners27 and active S corporation shareholders as wages (or
self-employment income) as increasing revenue (apparently only FICA or
on-budget portion) for 2005 (from then assumed date of enactment)
through 2010 in the aggregate of$23 billion (for the period 2005-14,
$57.4 billion).
2. "Over the period 2006-2015, this option is estimated to increase on-budget
revenues by $36.3 billion, increase off-budget revenues by $28.2 billion,
and increase outlays by $0.5 billion, for a net increase in revenues of $64
billion overall.,,28

G. TIGTA
2002 Pool
1. In 2002 the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration selected 84
S corporations out of a pool of 3 85 S corporations that had less than
$10,000 of officer compensation and S corporation ordinary income
greater than $50,000 for 1998 and for which IRS examination had been
closed. 29
a. In this sample of 84 S corporations only 58 reported officer
distributions such as cash or property or loans. 3o
b. In this subset of 58 cases IRS examiners did not address officer
compensation in 13 (22% of the cases). 31
c. In this sample of 84 S corporation tax returns average officer
wages were $5,300 and average distribution of profits was
$349,323. 32
ii. 2005 TIGTA
1. 78.9% of all S-corporations were either wholly owned by a single
shareholder (69.4%) or had a single shareholder control more than 50% of
the stock (9.5%).
a. This is significant because where one person is solely controlling
and operating an S-corporation, the determination of salary is
unilateral, highly subjective and influenced by the knowledge that
a higher salary will result in higher employment taxes and
therefore lower profits. 33
2. Number of Shareholders
1.

27 This was to cover limited partners and members of limited liability companies who materially participated in the
entity's business.
28 2005 Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 10, at 174, 177 (testimony of George K. Yin, Chief of Staff, Joint
Committee on Taxation). The increase in outlays probably would arise from S corporation shareholders increasing
accrual of social security benefits. Economist witnesses at the Hearings testified that such increased benefits should
be taken into account. Id. at 25 (testimony of Dr. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director Congressional Budget Office).
29TREAS. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMIN., FINAL AUDIT REPORT: THE IRS DOES NOT
AL WAYS ADDRESS SUBCHAPTER S CORPORATION OFFICER COMPENSATION DURING
EXAMINATIONS (2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2002reports/200230125fr.html
30Id. at 1.
.
31 !d.
32 !d. at 3
33 2005 Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 10 at 50 (prepared statement of Hon. Russell George, Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration).
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III.

a. 55.9% have one shareholder
b. 29.8% have two shareholders
i. TIOTA counts spousal shareholders as a single shareholder, a
position supported by the Code.
3. Underfunding
a. TIOTA estimated in 2005 that absent changes in the law for 20062010, the Social Security and Medicare employment tax gaps
resulting from under-compensation of Subchapter S shareholders
would amount over such period to $30.8 and $30.2 billion,
respectively.34
b. In 2000 alone single-shareholder S-corporations paid $5.7 billion
less than if they had been treated as sole-proprietors. 35
i. The total tax gap from employment underreporting is about
$54 billion. 36
c. In 2003 TIOTA later estimated that sole shareholder S
corporations avoided "nearly $8.4 billion in employment taxes in
TY 2003, or $4,404 on the average,,37
4. Salary Paid
a. Owners of single-shareholder S corporations paid themselves
salaries subject to employment taxes that equaled only 47.1% of
their profits in TY 1994, which fell to just 41.5% by TY 2001. ,,38
b. For 2003 the percentage had fallen further to 40;25%.39
Wage Tax Authorities
A. Where a shareholder is also an employee of the S corporation, both the S
corporation and the employee-shareholder have an incentive to characterize a
payment to the employee-shareholder as a dividend (or some other non-wage)
distribution rather than as compensation for such services because only payments
for compensation are su~ect to Federal employment taxes if the form of the
distribution is respected. 0

The Service's updated estimate of the gross tax gap for 2001 included a $39 billion tax gap of self-employment
taxes and $15 billion of FICA and unemployment taxes. Internal Revenue Service, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates,
IR-2006-28 (Feb. 14,2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0.. id=154496.00.htmI.
35
2005 Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 10 at 20 (statement ofHon. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration).
36 GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX COMPLIANCE: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO
REDUCE THE TAX GAP USING A VARlETY OF APPROACHES 4 Table I (GAO-06-1000T Jul. 26, 2006). In
comparison the individual Tax Gap for 2001 for was estimated to be $80.4 billion before the National Research
program and $78 billion after. Hearing on A Closer Look at the Size and Sources ofthe Tax Gap Statistics Before
the Senate Committee on Finance's Subcommittee on Taxation and IRS Oversight, S. Hearing. No. 109-1004, 109th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 84-5 Figs. I and 2 (2007)(Written Statement ofTIGTA Russell George)("SIZE AND SOURCES
OF THE TAX GAP"). Most of these figures appear to have consisted of self-employment tax (an area in which
there is much greater non-compliance) and the S corporation amounts in general were carried over from the 1984
TCM and did not reflect the 2005 NRP of S corporations. Id. at 87
37 EXAMINATION RESULTS FOR PARTNERSHIPS AND S CORPORATIONS, supra note 9 at 6.
38
2005 Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 3, at 20 (statement ofHon. Russell George, Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Administration).
39 See Luttrell, S Corporation, 2003, supra note I, at 165.
40 E.g., Brewer Quality Homes, Inc v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2003-200, affd per curiam, 122 Fed. Appx. 88;
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25273 (5th Cir. 2004). Accord, Charlotte's Office Boutique, Inc. v. Commissioner, 121 T.C.

34
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B. Not an Em,Rloyee
i. Both IRS 1 and the Social Security Administration42 can recharacterize actual
distributions (e.g., cast in theform of dividends, loans, royalties, etc.) by an S
corporation to a shareholder (typically an officer) as wages, if in substance they
are payments for services to the S corporation.

C. Independent Contractor
1.

After the above IRS substance-over-fonn victories, some practitioners
repeatedly attempted unsuccessfully to evade the wages taxes for themselves
and clients by claiming the safe harbor of Revenue Act of 1978 Section 530 for
treatment by the corporation of the shareholder as an independent contractor for
whom no withholding of wage taxes was required,43 while most of the S

89, 105 (2003), affd, 425 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2005); Joseph Radtke, S.c. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143, (E.D.
Wis. 1989), affd, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990)("substance, not the form" controls as to whether S corporation
dividends to shareholder who performs substantial services without any direct compensation constitute ''wages'');
Rev. Rut. 74-44, 1974-1 C.B. 287; Construction & Design Co., v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services,
563 F.3d 593, 595-96 (7tb Cir. 2009)(Posner, J)("The distinction between accounting profits, losses, assets, and
liabilities, on the one hand and cash flow on the other is especially important when one is dealing with either a firm
undergoing reorganization in bankruptcy or a small privately held firm; in the latter case, in order to avoid double
taxation (corporate income tax plus personal iricome tax on dividends), the company might try to make its profits
disappear into officers' salaries. See Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620, (7th Cir. Mar. 10,2009). The
owners of a Subchapter S corporation, however, have the opposite incentive--to alchemize salary into earnings. A
corporation has to pay employment taxes, such as state unemployment insurance tax and social security tax, on the
salaries it pays. A Subchapter S corporation can avoid paying them by recharacterizing salary as a distribution of
corporate income. To limit the ability of shareholder-employees to minimize their salaries and thus the company's
employment taxes, the government requires that they be paid 'reasonable salaries. "')(emphasis added); Joint
Committee on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures 98, 102 (JCS-02-05 Jan.
27,2005).
41 Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1990)(in determining whether S corporation
dividends are wages for employment taxes, courts "must look at the substance of the transaction, not the form");
Joseph Radtke, S.c. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143, (E.D. Wis. 1989), affd, 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir.
1990)("substance, not the form" controls as to whether S corporation dividends to shareholder who perfonns
substantial services without any direct compensation constitute "wages").
42 Ludeking v. Finch, 421 F.2d 499,502-03 (8th Cir. 1970)(The purpose of the benefit provisions of the Social
Security Act require on the basis of fairness and equality of treatment that some of distributed Subchapter S
dividends be considered under substance over form to be wages). Accord, Pointer v. Shaiaia, 841 F. Supp. 201, 204
(N.D. Tex. 1993).
43 (Never mind that the shareholder-independent contractor never reported the distributions as self-employment
income.) On the same day in 2002 the Tax Court handed down 6 almost identical cases involving James M. Grey,
CPA, sole shareholder in an S corporation with business profits who was paid no formal compensation claiming that
he was an independent contractor, and five of his clients. All lost in the Tax Court and on appeal on the grounds
there was no reasonable basis under Section 530 to not treat the sole shareholder officer who is the corporation's
central worker as an employee. Joseph M Grey Public Accountant, P.c., v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 121 (2002),
aff'dwithout published opinion, 93 Fed. Appx. 473 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Nu-Look Design, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 543 U.S. 821 (2004). Another series of zero compensation corporate officers this time linked by the
same tax adviser attorney, Robert E. Kovacevich, span 1990 through 2006 and display shifting tactics, or at least
fora, as the taxpayers lost. The most well-known is Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90 (9th Cir.
1990)(Ninth Circuit rejected alternative arguments that (a) payments made to stockholders in a subchapter S
corporation were not wages but dividends and (b) the shareholder-officer was an independent contractor, denying
Section 530 relief because there was no reasonable basis for not treating the sole shareholder/full time worker as an
employee); Van Camp & Bennion, P.s. v. United States, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10889 (E.D. Wash. 1996)(one
attorney performing substantial services, held statutory employee, other semi-retired performing minimal services
held independent contractor), remanded without opinion 238 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2000)(remanded to determine
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corporations' profits were structured as loans, dividends or royalties to their
officer shareholders providing more than minor services.

D. Some but Still Unreasonable Compensation
i. With rare exceptions,44 in the above cases the shareholder performing services
did not include any amount as wages. Commentators suggest that absent
abusive zero compensation and all withdrawals cast as dividends, "the IRS
may have difficulty asserting that dividend distributions made by an S
corporation to shareholder-employees who are otherwise paid reasonable
salaries should be characterized as additional wages subject to Social
Security taxes.,,45 Anecdotally many concluded that as long as some wages
were paid, S shareholder-employees had little to worry about. .
ii. Very recently two federal district court opinions indicate that relatively
substantial officer compensation may not shield distributions by an S
corporation from re characterization as compensation for wage tax purposes.
111. David E. Watson P.c., a sole shareholder S corporation, was a 25% partner in
an accounting firm (with four equal partners), LWBJ. 46 The S corporation paid
its sole shareholder, Watson, a salary of $24,000 in both 2002 and 2003 and
paid federal employment taxes on that amount. In 2002 in addition to such
salary the S corporation distributed to Watson $203,651 of which it
recorded $118,159 as dividends and the balance apparently as interest free
loans. In 2003 in addition to his $24,000 salary, Watson received from the
S corporation $221,577 as dividend payments. In each year reported
compensation was approximately 10% of reported compensation plus
distributionsY In 2007 IRS determined that $130,730.05 of the 2002 dividend
amount of refund), remand affirmed 251 F.3rd 862 (9th Cir. 2001); Seeds, Inc v. United States, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15378 (E.D. Wash. 1998»(11% shareholder/treasurer perfonned only minor services and not under title of
treasurer, held independent contractor). Then in 2000 Kovacevich shifted to the Claims Court in Western
Management, Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 543 (2000)(no reasonable basis for the corporation not treating the
attorney-shareholder as an employee). In 2003 the attorney forum shifted to the Tax Court in a case with a more
sophisticated structuring of payment of a minimum salary plus distributions cast as rents and royaIties-- still to no
avail in Charlotte's Office Boutique, Inc. v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 89 (2003), supplemental opinion, T.C. Memo
2004-43, affd 425 F.3 rd 1203 (9th Cir. 2005)(taxpayer used intangible property in her sole proprietorship to earn
self-employment income subject to self- employment tax, she can't "avoid the payment of Federal employment
taxes simply by declaring that she will be paying royalties to herself through a controlled corporation for its use of
that property.").
44 Charlotte's Office Boutique, supra.
4S C Wells Hall, III, & Jordan P. Rose, Considerations in Choice ofEntity Revisited, N.Y.U. 62ND INST. ON FED.
TAX. §15.06[3][f][iv], p. 15-05 (2004). Options to Improve Tax Compliance, supra note 1 at 111 ("enforcement of
this rule by the government may be difficult because it involves factual detenninations on a case-by-case basis.);
Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Reform: Selected Federal Tax Issues Relating to Small Business and Choice of
Entity 68 (JCX-48-08 June 4, 2008)("requiring taxpayer audits and potentially involving costly, resource-consuming
litigation"); Noncompliance with S Corporation Tax Rules, supra note 2 at 27.
46 David E. Watson P.e. v. United States 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa May 27,2010).
47

Tax year

1
Reported
compensation

2
Reported
dividends

3
Compensation
as percentage
of 1+2

4.
Distributions
in excess of
compensation

5
Compensation
as percentage
of 1+4

2002

$24,000

$118,159

16.88%

$203,651

10.54%
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6
Compensation
recharacterized
by IRS as
wa,[es
$130,730

payments to Watson should be recharacterized as wages subject to employment
taxes; and $175,470.00 of the 2003 dividend payments, as wages subject to
employment taxes. Upon audit David E. Watson p.e. recharacterized

$67,044.00 of the dividend distributions as wages for each of 2002 and
2003,48 paid $4,064 of the assessments of$48,519.30 for such years for wage
taxes, penalties and interest. David E. Watson P.C. then sued in the district court
for a refund of such payment.
At trial in David E. Watson P.e. v. United States the IRS expert relying
on outside studies concluded that (1) the S corporation and the accounting finn
were considerably more profitable than peers (twice as profitable in the latter
case), (2) Watson's salary was lower than reported median salary for new
accounting graduates, and (3) AICPA Management Accounting Practice
"survey indicated that an average 'owner' (defined as both an investor in
and an employee of a firm) in a firm the size of L WBJ would receive
approximate $176,000 annually, reflecting both compensation and return
on investment. A director (defined as solely an employee with no
investment interest) would realize approximately $70,000 compensation
annually. *** [The IRS expert] evaluated billing rates for owners and directors
and found that owners billed at a rate approximately 33% higher than did a
director. Accordingly, [he] increased the director's estimated
compensation by 33% to obtain an estimated comparable salary for
someone in Watson's position of approximately $93,000. [He] then reduced
this amount to $91,044 to account for certain untaxable fringe benefits.,,49
The district court in Watson rejected the taxpayer's main contention
that the S corporation's intent controlled whether a distribution was
compensation or a dividend. The Watson court relied on well-known
substance over form decisions50 and an unreported case discussed immediately
below.
A reasonable person in Watson's role within LWBJ would
unquestionably be expected to earn far more than a $24,000 salary
for his services. As such, the $24,000 salary Watson opted to pay
himself as DEWPC's sole shareholder, officer, and employee, is
incongruent with the fmancial position of LWBJ and in light of
Watson's experience and contributions to LWBJ, and when
compared to the approximately $200,000 in distributions DEWPC

I 2003

I

I

I

I

I

I

$24,000
$221,577
09.77%
$221,577
09.77%
$175,470
"Some" of the difference in 2002 between reported dividends and distribution was treated by taxpayer as interest
free loans.
48 Apparently the taxpayer was attempting to treat belatedly as "reasonable" compensation an amount approximating
the taxable wage base which was $84,900 and $89,000 for 2002 and 2003, respectively. See wwwl.umn.edU/ohr/
payrolVtaxlwagelimits/index.html.
nd
49 Watson, 757 F. Supp. 2
at 883-84 (emphasis added).
50 Rev. Rul. 74-44; Joseph Radtke, S.c. v. United States; and Spicer Accounting, Inc. v. United States. Watson, 757
F. Supp. 2nd at 887, 889 ("the characterization of funds disbursed by an S corporation to its employees or
shareholders turns on an analysis of whether the 'payments at issue were made,' .. as remuneration for services
performed.' Radtke, 895 F.2d at 1197. This approach conforms with well settled jurisprudence holding that tax

consequences are governed by the economic realities of a transaction, not by the form of the transaction or
labels given it by tbe parties.").
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received in each of 2002 and 2003. Moreover, the $24,000 salary is
low when compared to salaries that could reasonably be expected to
be earned by persons with experience similar to that of Watson, and
holding a position such as Watson held in a firm comparable to
L WBJ. Indeed, upon evaluation of all of the facts and
circumstances in this case, the Court is convinced that DEWPC
structured Watson's salary and dividend payments in an effort to avoitJ
/ederal employment taxes, with /ull knowledge that dividends paid to
Watson were actually "remuneration/or services performed." ***
Accordingly, the Court adopts Ostrovsky's calculations and finds
that, for each of the years 2002 and 2003, the reasonable amount of
Watson's "remuneration for services performed" was $91,044. This
amount is $67,044 more than the $24,000 annual salary paid by DEWPC
to Watson, and DEWPC, accordingly, is obligated to pay the appropriate
FICA taxes, interest, and penalties on the recharacterized amounts51
Note that $91,044 is slightly more than the taxable wage base for
2002 and 2003 and sligt"tly less than 50% of the total distributions by the S
corporation. Thus, Watson factually supports a conventional rule of thumb

as to "reasonable compensation" in single-shareholder S corporations of
paying to the officer-shareholder wages equal to either the covered wages
under FICA ($106,800 for 20ll 52) or ~ of business profits. 53 Moreover,
judging from the media, including business magazines published by AICP A, 54
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 55 and Business Week,56 most reputable tax
Watson, 757 F. SUpp. 2nd at 890, 891 (emphasis added).
S2 http://www 1. umn.eduiobr/payroIVtax/wagelimits/index.html
S3 Cyndia Zwahlen, Small-Business Report; Small moves could trigger IRS audits, L.A .TIMES, Mar. 7,2007, at C6 ("Some suggest the corporation set aside 50% of profit for salaries, others suggest claiming at least the full amount
that is subject to Social Security and Medicare tax ....")(UFailure to take a reasonable compensation from your S
corporation is a flag to the IRS that you may be underreporting your true income and thus avoiding income and
payroll taxes."); Ann Meyer, Tax rules complicate salary situation, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 2, 2002, at B-3 ("a
good rule ofthiunb is to pay yourself the maximum that is subject to Social Security tax ... and the IRS should be
satisfied, experts say. 'If you pay yourself much less than that, you risk the IRS challenging you that your
compensation is unreasonably low. "').
S4 Roger Russell, IRS S corporation audit plan draws mixed reviews, 19 ACCOUNTING TODAY 3 (Sept. 5,
2005)(Tax Liaison Committee chairman of the American Association of Attomey-CPAs believed that there is a fair
amount of abuse. "People are taking salaries that are too low, sometimes as little as zero, to beat the 15 percent
FICA tax~ Or there are those who pay themselves $10,000, but take out $90,000 in distributions.")(Director of
Government Affairs National Small Business Association agreed that "some things are indefensible - for example,
taking a $5,000 salary and $95,000 in distributions [but] our membership is always concerned when the IRS decides
to ramp up audits of small businesses.").
55 Gloria Gibbs Marullol, The Question O/Payment For S Corporations' Owners, NATION'S BUSINESS 28 (Sept.
1998)(quoting IRS agent, "So when we look at the line for officers' compensation on an S-corporation return and
see a shareholder who works 100 percent of his time in the corporation, takes a salary of 5,000, and has distributions
of $60,000, we're going to get curious.")(CPA "advises the owner-employees of profitable S corporations to use the
Social Security FICA limit as a rock-bottom guide for salary."); Randy Myers, Setting the Size o/Your Paycheck,
NATION'S BUSINESS 30 (July 1998)(quoting CPA; UIfyou want to get yourself a quick audit, show a profitable S
corporation making distributions without paying any salary to the owner.").
56 Lynn Brenner, Tax Facts, BUSINESS WEEK SB-40 (Apr. 2, 2001)("DON'T ... claim a tiny salary from your
profitable S corporation to minimize Social Security and Medicare taxes. It's a red flag to the IRS."); Roy Furchgott,

51
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professionals would agree that a zero compensation S corporation officershareholder rendering more than minor services to a profitable S corporation is
scoffing57 at the "reasonable compensation" requirement of the tax law. s8
IV. Watson also cited an unreported district court case-- JD & Associates, Ltd. v.
United States. 59 There.an S corporation carrying on a professional business
paid compensation to its sole (professional) shareholder ranging from 25 to 39%
of its ordinary income over a 3 year period. GO IRS detennined the taxpayer's
reasonable compensation on the basis of expert opinions of an Accredited
Valuation Analyst based on a national survey of financial ratios 61 and assessed'
additional taxes based on this detennination. The taxpayer paid about 10% of
the assessed amount and sued for a refund of this payment. The government
resisted the taxpayer's refund claim and counter claimed for the balance of the
assessment. The district court applied traditional reasonable compensation
multi factors 62 finding the taxpayer's claim without merit and the government's
counter claim valid.
v. If a business was essentially providing services, and perhaps selling a few goods
incidental to providing the services, capital has not been deemed a material
Not Quite Ready to Stop Working?, BUSINESS WEEK 131 (July 17, 2000)(quoting a certified financial
planner)("Some people take 100% as profit and zero in salary. That's very aggressive, and the IRS can come in and
hit you with taxes").
57 2005 Senate Finance Hearings, supra note 10 at 30.
58 Ilana DeBare, Mind Your Business; With unconventional service, injluence the injluencers, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Sept. 20, 2006, at C-l (quoting CPA)("Ifyou are drawing a zero or low salary, watch out, because
you'll have the auditors coming after you."); Fritz, supra note 72 at 608 (facts are overwhelmingly in IRS's favor
when a controlling shareholder acts as a company's sole service provider and draws no salary); Diane Hess, IRS
effort could tax smallfirms; S corporations will be randomly audited; extra work/or busy owners, CRAIN'S NEW
YORK BUSINESS 25 (Sept. 19, 2005)(many accountants predict IRS will be watching for S corporation owners
who dodge self-employment taxes by paying themselves little or no salary) (quoting tax lawyer, "if someone is an S
corp owner, he will want to make sure that he is paying himself a salary").
59 (Case No. 3:04-cv-59 D. N.D. May 19,2006), electronically available, www.bvresources.coml
BVWireCentraVMateriallBVWire52-3/IDAssocvUS.pdf.
60

year

1997
1998
1999

1
Reported
compensation

2
Ordinary
income

3
Percentage 1 of
2

$19,000
$30,000
$30,000

$76,221
$83,667
$77,320

24.93%
35.86%
38.80%

4
Dividend
paid next
year as to
advances in
prior year
$47,000
$50,000
$50,000

5
IRS
determination of
reasonable
compensation
$61,817
$63,673
$77,320

The same IRS expert as in Watson applied the same outside surveys.
(I)Employee qualifications; (2) the nature, extent, and scope of the employee's work; (3) the size and complexity
of the business; (4) prevailing general economic conditions; (5) the employee's compensation as a percentage of
gross and net income; (6) the employee-shareholder's compensation compared with distributions to shareholders;
«8) prevailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable concerns; and (9) comparison of
compensation paid to a particular shareholder-employee in previous years where the corporation where the
corporation has a limited number of officers. Charles Schneider & Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 148, 182 (8 th Cir.
1974).
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income-producing factor in the business. See United States v. Van Dyke, 696
F.2d 957 (Fed. Cir. 1982).
For purposes of the limitation of tax rate on earned income §1.13483(a)(3)(ii) provided that generally "capital is not a material income-producing
factor where gross income of the business consists principally of fees,
commissions, or other compensation for personal services performed by an
individual. Thus, the practice of his profession by a doctor, dentist, lawyer,
architect or accountant will not, as such, be treated as a trade or business in
which capital is a material income-producing factor even though the practitioner
may have a substantial capital investment in professional equipment or in the
physical plant constituting the office from which he conducts his practice since
his capital investment is regarded as only incidental to his professional practice
from which he or she operated."
Similarly §736(b)(2) permits payments for "unstated goodwill" to a
retiring general partner to be treated 'as a guaranteed payment or distributive
share if capital is not a material income- producing factor. "For purposes of this
provision, capital is not a material income-producing factor where

substantially all the gross income of the business consists of fees,
commissions, or other compensation for personal services performed by an
individual. The practice of his or her profession by a doctor, dentist,
lawyer architect, or accountant will not, as such, be treated as a trade or
business in which capital is a material income-producing factor even
though the practitioner may have a substantial capital investment in
professional equipment or in the physical plant constituting the office from
which such individual conducts his or her practice so long as such capital
investment is merely incidental to such professional practice." H.R. Report
No. 103-111; 103 Congo 1st Sess. 782-83 (1993), reprinted in 1993-3 C.B. 35859
The same notion probably underlies temporary PAL regulation § 1.4695T(d):
d) Personal service activity. An activity constitutes a personal
service activity for purposes of paragraph (a)(6) of this section if such
activity involves the performance of personal services in-

(A)The fields of health, law, engineering, architecture,
accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, or consulting; or
(B) Any other trade or business in which capital is not a
material income-producing factor. (emphasis added).
In sharp contrast to this approach as to partnerships, etc., where
deductibility of reasonable compensation paid by a C corporation has been the
issue, payment of a the portion of a corporation's profits attributable, for example,
to the efforts of paralegals and other legal assistants (less their pay and allocable
overhead) should not constitute reasonable compensation to the professional
shareholder, Pediatric Surgical Associates P.e. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2001-81; nor should payment of profits attributable to professional goodwill,
provided that the professional had signed a covenant not to compete, cf Martin
Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189,207 (1998); SchUbach v.
18

Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1991-556 (some of the goodwill of the medical
practice was inherent in the operating entity where physician signed a noncompete covenant and more importantly was leaving the state); see generally
Tom Daley, Edwards's S Corporation, Medicare Tax, and Fair Share, 104 TAX
NOTES 1577 (Sept. 27, 2004); Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of
Treating Personal Goodwill as Property in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1 (2005).
VI. The Joint Committee Staff ably sets out the issues, particularly as to
administrability, in separating returns on labor and capital in a service business
(opting for the traditional all labor in a services business). Joint Committee on
Taxation, Tax Reform: Selected Federal Tax Issues Relating to Small Business
and Choice ofEntity 60-72 (JCX-4,8-08 Jun. 4, 2008).
E. Multi-Entity splits
63
1. Robucci v. Commissioner
Robucci, a psychiatrist, sought advice from Carson
an attorney-C.P.A., specializing in choice of tax planning for small businesses,64
as to minimizing the tax liability arising from his practice. Carson restrUctured '
Robucci's practice from a sole proprietorship to a limited liability company
(Robucci LLC) with two members: Robucci, owning 95%, and a wholly-owned
"manager" corporation (Robucci P.C.), owning 5%. Carson also organized a
second corporation (Westsphere) to perform non-patient care management
services associated with Robucci's practice. Robucci's 95% in LLC was
divided between a 10% general partner interest and an 85% limited partner
interest attributable to intangibles associated with the practice. Robucci paid
self-employment tax only on distributions associated with his 10% general
partner interest, whereas, as a sole proprietor, he was required to pay selfemployment tax on the entire net income from his psychiatric practice:
The Tax Court agreed with IRS that Robucci P.C. and Westsphere
accomplished no significant business purpose and were, in substance, hollow
corporate shells formed primarily for tax avoidance and, therefore, were
disregarded for Federal tax purposes. Therefore, Robucci LLC was a single
member LLC and not having elected taxation as a corporation was a disregarded
entity, resulting in Robucci being taxed as a sole proprietor subject to selfemployment tax on all of the income of Robucci LLC. The Tax Court also held
Robucci liable to the 20% negligence penalty of §6662 accuracy-related
penalty.
During his first meeting with Carson, Robucci stated that he wanted
to minimize the amount of taxes he was paying. After discussing various
options to achieve that goal, Carson recommended, and persuaded. Robucci to
adopt, an organizational structure, involving an LLC and two corporations. That
initial discussion also covered the possibility of structuring Robucci's
practice in such a way as to reduce the amount of self-employment tax that
he was paying while also minimizing any other tax liabilities that he might
incur. Robucci did not seek a second opinion from any other C.P.A.s or
T.C. Memo. 2011-19, on appeal to Jd h Circuit.
64 The CPA finn had a client list of some 3,500 clients, mostly small businesses. Choice-of entity planning for those
clients constituted a significant portion of the finn's practice.
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attorneys assessing the merits of Carson's recommendations, nor did Carson
provide him with a written explanation of the need to form three separate
entities. He did explain orally to Robucci that the LLC would conduct the
practice, that (for reasons not made clear to Robucci) it needed to have two
members (Robucci and what became Robucci P.C.), and that Westsphere
would be considered a business management corporation, uninvolved in
patient care.
Robucci was the sole shareholder of both corporations. Robucci's 95%
direct LLC ownership interest was reflected on Robucci LLC's partnership
returns as split between an 85% interest as a limited partner and a 10% interest
as a general partner. Carson determined the 850/0 and 10% split in
Robucci's LLC ownership interests on his determination of an 85% limited
partner ownership interest as the value of Robucci's goodwill and what
would be a reasonable rate of return on that goodwill at the time he formed
Robucci LLC. Carson never discussed with Robucci the basis for the
85/10% allocation between his limited and general partner interests in
Robucci LLC (although Robucci did understand that his 10% general
partnership interest represented his interest as a provider of medical services and
his 85% limited partnership interest represented his interest attributable to his
capital contribution of intangibles), nor did Carson prepare a written
valuation in support of his attribution of an 85% limited partner interest to
transferred intangibles. Moreover, Robucci did not make any written
assignment of the tangible or intangible assets of his practice to Robucci
LLC.
Carson also drafted a document entitled "Operating Agreement"
whereby Robucci P.C., with a 5% LLC interest, was designated as manager
of Robucci LLC. The Tax Court was uncertain whether Robucci ever
executed that agreement on behalf of either of the parties, Robucci P.C.
and Robucci LLC. Robucci had a limited understanding of the need for
the entities formed and the agreements and other documents drafted by
Carson. He relied on Carson's representations that the actions taken would
legitimately result in the tax minimization that he sought.
Robucci did not have an employment agreement with any of the 3
entities and neither of the corporations paid him or anyone else salaries.
Robucci did not keep records of any time he might have worked for
Westphere, the management corporation. He was aware that Westsphere
charged management fees to Robucci LLC, but he did not know the nature
of those charges, other than that they probably related to his time spent
performing functions related to his medical practice that did not involve actual
patient care.
Both before and after the formation of Robucci LLC, Ms. Williams
was the billing assistant for Robucci's practice. During the years in issue,
although she received instructions from Robucci in letters with a letterhead that
referred to "Tony L. Robucci, M.D., A Professional L.L.C.", she still
considered herself to be in the employ of Dr. Robucci.
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Beginning with their dates of organization and throughout the years in
issue, Robucci LLC and the corporations used the same business address,
although there was no written lease agreement between Robucci LLC and
either of the corporations. The corporations did not (1) have separate Web
sites or telephone listings, (2) pay rent to Dr. Robucci or Robucci LLC, (3)
have customers other than Robucci LLC or contracts with any other third
parties, or (4) advertise. Westsphere did not have separate dedicated space
in Dr. Robucci's office.
The Tax Court reasoned that a "corporation will be recognized as a
separate taxable entity if (1) the purpose for its formation is the equivalent of
business activity or (2) the incorporation is followed by the carrying on of a
business by the corporation. Moline Props., Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436,
438-439 (1943).
The Tax Court agreed with IRS that (1) the corporations "were
created solely for the purpose of reducing. Robucci's tax liability" and,
more specifically, to help him "avoid income and self-employment taxes";
(2 Robucci "did not otTer any credible explanation of the business purpose.
for forming the corporations"; and (3) he "did not demonstrate that either
corporation engaged in any business activity after it was formed."
While Carson, as sketched above, did.not prove written reasons fot the
above structure, he did hand write a note while his firm was preparing the
Robucci P.C. and Westsphere returns for one of the years in issue, in which he
states: "We need P.e. to be a partner in LLC only Westsphere is the mgmt.
corp. P.e. does nada [nothing}."
Our disregard of Robucci P.C. for Federal tax purposes leaves
Robucci LLC as a single-member LLC; and because of its failure to
make a protective election under section 301.7701-3(a), Proced. &.
Admin. Regs., to be classified as an association, i.e., as a corporation,
see sec. 301.7701-2(b)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs., it too is disregarded
for Federal tax purposes under section 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii), Proced. &
Admin. Regs. The result is that Dr. Robucci is treated as a sole
proprietor for Federal tax purposes, which was his status before the
formation of Robucci LLC and the corporations. It follows, and we hold,
that the net income arising from his psychiatric practice during the years
in issue, including any amounts paid to Robucci P.C. and Westsphere,
was self-employment income of Dr. Robucci subject to self-employment
tax under section 1401.
As to the 20% accuracy-rated penalty because there was a "substantial
understatement of income tax," the Tax Court did not have to reach whether
Robucci was negligent. But its discussion of whether §6664(c)(I) reveals that
the court thought that he was. That Section provides that the negligence penalty
will not be imposed with respect to any portion of an underpayment if a
taxpayer shows that there was reasonable cause for, and that the taxpayer acted
in good faith with respect to, that portion. Reasonable cause has been found
when a taxpayer selects a competent tax adviser, supplies the adviser with all
relevant information and, in a manner consistent with ordinary business care
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and prudence, relies on the adviser's professional judgment as to the taxpayer's
tax obligations.

Reliance on a professional tax adviser will not be considered
reasonable, however, if the adviser is a promoter of the transaction or
suffers from a conflict of interest that the taxpayer knew of or should have
known about. IRS argued that the taxpayer should have requested a second
opinion after getting advice that was clearly too good to be true". Respondent
views Mr. Carson as "the promoter of the arrangement, who earned substantial
fees for incorporating the various sham entities and preparing the tax returns at
issue". Petitioners deny that Mr. Carson was a promoter and argues that, in the
light of Mr. Carson's status as an independent, experienced C.P.A., Dr. Robucci
was under no obligation to obtain a second opinion before he could reasonably
rely on Mr. Carson's advice. Even if we were to agree with petitioner that Mr.
Carson was not a promoter, we agree with respondent that the tax result
afforded by implementing Mr. Carson's suggestions, i.e., the dramatic
reduction in Dr. Robucci's self-employment taxes, was "too good to be
true." See, e.g., Neonatology Associate, P.A. v. Commissioner, 299 F.3d at 234
("When * * * a taxpayer is presented with what would appear to be a fabulous
opportunity to avoid tax obligations, he should recognize that he proceeds at his
own peril."); McCrary v. Commissioner, 92 T.e. 827, 850 (1989) (stating that
no reasonable person should have trusted the tax scheme in question to work).
It is not that Mr. Carson's goal of directing some of Dr. Robucci's
income to a third-party corporate management service provider and
bifurcating Dr. Robucci's interest in Robucci LLC so that he would be
separately compensated for the use of his intangibles was obviously
unreasonable. On the contrary, had it been more carefully implemented, it
well might have been realized, at least in part. The problem for Dr.
Robucci is that Mr. Carson's strategy for implementing his tax
minimization goal was patently inadequate to the task, a fact that should
have been obvious to Dr. Robucci and have prompted him to either
question Mr. Carson or seek a second opinion. Although Robucci P.C. and
Westsphere were properly formed under Colorado law to carry out legitimate
corporate functions, the fact that they were nothing more than empty shells,
devoid of property, personnel, or actual day-to-day activities, i.e., of
substance, should have sent warning signals to Dr. Robucd that those
corporations were not effecting any meaningful change in the prior conduct
of his medical practice. Although Dr. Robucci may have had some vague
notion that he was acting on behalf of Westsphere when performing services
other than actual patient care, there is little or no evidence as to the precise
mtture ofthose services, the time Dr. Robucci may have spent performing them,
or their value. In short, there is no support for any charge from Westsphere to
Robucci LLC for such services or for the claim that Dr. Robucci was wearing a
Westsphere hat when he performed them. For Dr. Robucci, aside from signing a
raft of documents and shifting some money between two new bank accounts, it
was business as usual. Moreover, although he might have been justified in
relying upon Mr.Carson's expert valuation of his intangibles as the basis for the
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85-10 split between his limited and general partnership interests in Robucci
LLC, the lack of any formal transfer of those intangibles to Robucci LLC
should have been cause for concern. Under those circumstances, it was
incumbent upon Or. Robucci, even though he was not a tax professional, to
question the efficacy of the arrangement that purported to minimize his taxes
while effecting virtually no change in the conduct of his medical practice. By
not doing so, Dr. Robucci failed to exercise the ordinary business care and
prudence required of him under the circumstances.
ii. Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. No.7
(2011), involved a limited liability partnership (LLP), carrying on a tax law
practice. Three of the law firm's partners were attorneys performing legal
services. The fourth partner was an S corporation owned by a tax-exempt
ESOP whose beneficiaries were the law firm's three attorney partners. The S
corporation's business activities primarily involved the purchase, sale, and
rental of real estate. The three attorney partners each had a one-third capital
interest and a 30% profits and loss interest in the law firm. The S corporation
had a 10% profits and loss interest in the law firm. Approximately 99% of the
law firm's net business income for its tax year was derived from legal services
rendered by the three attorney partners.
The law firm allocated 87.557% of its net business income to the S
corporation. Because the S corporation was solely owned by the ESOP, it paid
no income or self-employment tax with respect to its distributive shares from
the LLP. The LLP did not report any of its income as net earnings from selfemployment. In 2005, the partnership recapitalized to provide for a general
managing partner interest (a GP interest) and an investing partner interest (an
LP interest). The three individual partners each had a 1% GP interest and a
32% LP interest (The S corporation was no longer a partner). Allocations were
generally limited to a partner's collections and no self-employment tax was paid
on allocations to the LP interests.
IRS determined that the 2004 "special allocation" did not reflect
economic reality under §704(b)(2) and consequently reallocated the law firm's
net business income to its partners on the basis of each partner's profits and loss
interest. IRS further determined that the three attorney partners' distributive
shares of the law firm's net business income for tax years 2004 and 2005 were
net earnings from self":employment subject to tax on self-employment income.
The issue of the special allocation was easy. If the partnership agreement
is silent, the partners share per capita. No partnership agreement for 2004 was
introduced into evidence. The Tax Court then turned to (a) The partners'
relative capital contributions to the partnership; (b) the partners' respective
interests in partnership profits and losses; (c) the partners' relative interests· in
cashflow and other nonliquidating distributions; and (d) the partners' rights to
capital upon liquidation. None of these supported the special allocation.
The much more significant issue was the "limited partner" selfemployment tax issue discussed below.

F. "Limited Partner"
i. Renkemeyer
23

l. § 1402(a)(13) bars65 self-employment treatment of a limited partner's
distributive share of income or loss. The taxpayers in Renkemeyer argued
that the attorneys' "limited partner" interests "share characteristics of
those of a limited partner in a limited partnership because (a) their
interests are designated as limited partnership interests in the law firm's
organizational documents, and (b) his and Messrs. Campbell's and
Weaver's interests in the law firm enjoy limited liability pursuant to
Kansas law."
2. The Tax Court traced the tortured history of the lack of a definition of
"limited partner" under § 1402(a)(13) (proposed 1997 material
participation regulations, Congress' temporary" bar of final regulations,
advent ofLLC's and LLP's)-a. "Limited partner" is a technical term which has become obscured
over time because of the increasing complexity of partnerships
and other flowthrough entities as well as the history of section
1402(a)(13). We therefore must look to the legislative history for
guidance. *** [T]he intent of section 1402(a)(13) was to ensure
that individuals who merely invested in a partnership and
who were not actively participating in the partnership's
business operations (which was the archetype of limited
partners at the time) would not receive credits toward Social
Security coverage. The legislative history of section
1402(a)(13) does not support a holding that Congress
contemplated excluding partners who performed services for
a partnership in their capacity as partners. (i.e., acting in the
manner of self-employed persons), from liability for selfemployment taxes.
Aside from a nominal amount of income arising from
recognition of certain pass-through income from RCGW, all of
the law firm's revenues were derived from legal services
performed by petitioner and Messrs. Campbell and Weaver in
their capacities as partners. Petitioner and Messrs. Campbell
and Weaver each contributed a nominal amount ($110) for
their respective partnership units. Thus it is clear that the
partners' distributive shares of the law firm's income did not
arise as a return on the partners' investment and were not
"earnings which are basically of an investment nature."

65 Section' 1402(a)(13) redefined a partner's self-employment income to exclude the distributive share ofa limited
partner, other than Section 707(c) "guaranteed payments" to such a partner for services actually rendered to, or on
behalf of, the partnership. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §313(b), 91 Stat. 1509
(1977); H.R. Rep. No. 95-702, pt. 1, 95th Congo 2 nd Sess. 40 (I 977)(to the extent those payments are established to
be in the nature of remuneration for those services)/. See § 1402(aX13). A guaranteed payment is a payment to a
partner for services or the use of capital to the/ extent determined without regard to the income of the partnership.
See §704(d). See Pratt v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 203 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir.
1977)(holding payments based on partnership gross, rather than net, income are not guaranteed payments); contra
Rev. Rul. 81-300, 1981-2 C.B. 143.
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Instead, the attorney partners' distributive shares arose from
legal services they performed on behalf of the law firm.
3. Renkemeyer is consistent with a number of PAL cases which rejected
automatic passive loss treatment to members in LLC's and LLP's who
materially participated in the entity's business activities. 66
G. Roads Not Yet Completely Travelled
1. The Tax Court in Robucci did not address the IRS' alternative arguments
because it found that the 2 corporations were shells.
1. "(1) if the corporations are respected for Federal income tax purposes, he
may allocate all ,of their income and expenses and all of the income and
expenses of Robucci LLC to Dr. Robucci under the authority of sec. 482,
and (2) if the corporations are respected for tax purposes and respondent's
application of sec. 482 is deemed arbitrary and capricious, respondent may
allocate all of the income and expenses of the corporations and Robucci
LLC to Dr. Robucci under sec. 269A.
ii. Although not yet applied in the under compensated S shareholder for wage tax
purposes context, substantial analogous authority exists in the sole shareholder
professional corporation context that the arm's length charge ofa professional,
who has incorporated for his or her services, under §482 (providing IRS power
to reallocate income between controlled entities) is the amount including fringe
benefits that he or she would have earned absent incorporation. 67 This suggests
that IRS could detennine under §482 that the arm's length compensation that
should have been charged by the S Corporation shareholder for his or her
services is essentially equivalent to what he or she would have received absent
incorporation because that is what an uncontrolled taxpayer could demand and
obtain. 68 That amount would, under §482, constitute imputed compensation
income to the shareholder employee and an imputed deduction to the
corporation. 69 That imputed compensation would constitute wages to the S
corporation shareholder-employee. I agree with Professor Schwidetzky that
under a substance over fonn analysis absence of a distribution of S corporation
earnings should not affect the issue of under compensation of an active

66 Stewart Karlinsky, Self-Employment Taxes and PALs: The C~se o/LLCs, 132 Tax Notes 1391 (Sept. 26, 2011).
See, e.g., Garnett v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 368 (2009).
67 See John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective o/the Business Tax Entities Universe,' "Hey, the Stars Might
. Lie But the Numbers Never Do, " 78 TEX. L. REV. 885,932-33 (2000).
68 Keller v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1014, 1025 (1981)(§482 issue is whether professional corporation and
professional would have entered into their financial relationships had they been unrelated parties dealing at arm's
length." [O]ne would expect petitioner, in an arm's-length transaction with an unrelated party, to have bargained for
a total compensation package which would approximate the amounts he previously received as a sole proprietor.
One would similarly expect that petitioner's total compensation would also reflect any increase in MAL and MAL,
Inc.'s earnings over and above the pre-incorporation years."), ajf'd, 723 F.2d 58 (lOth Cir. 1983). Lee, Business Tax
Entities, supra note 67; Walter D. Schwidetzky, Integrating Subchapters K and S, Just Do It, 62 TAX LAW. 749,
799-800 (2010) applies similar reasoning to argue that in a closely held services S corporation, all of the income of
the S corporation is attributable to her services. Therefore, normally reasonable compensation is all of the net
income of the S Corporation. There still is a conceptual problem of return on intangible capital.
69 § 1.482-1; Haag v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 604 (1987)(court allocated payroll taxes as part of Section 482
allocation of adjustments to under-compensation professional).
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shareholder,70 but it probably does.

IV.

Where do we go from here?
A. New Ventures
1. I think that in the case of any 8 corporation recently electing 8 status and thus
receiving the IR8 8 election acceptance form clearly setting out the requirement
of payin~ reasonable compensation and the recharacterization power of the
Service, 1 which nevertheless pays zero or low compensation to an officer
performing more than minor services, manifests an intent to not comply with the
reasonable compensation for services requirement, i.e., evade wage taxes.

B. Existing Entities
i. IR8 should send "hard" letters at least to all 8 corporations controlled by a
single shareholder reporting on Form 11208 business income above a specified
level, say $100,000, while reporting no compensation paid to officers;72 setting
forth in some detail (1) the duty of an 8 corporation to pay reasonable
compensation to officers performing more than minor services, (2) the uniform
judicial (a) finding of no reasonable basis not to treat as employees officers
performing more than minor services for an 8 corporation and receiving
remuneration in any form, and (b) re-characterizing all distributions to her or
him in whatever form as compensation subject to wage taxes; (3) and warning
the taxpayer that if the 8 corporation and its controlling shareholder continue
this pattern of evading wage taxes in subsequent returns, negligence and
possibly, at least civil, fraud penalties may be imposed; and suggesting an
amended return; and (4) further warning that shifting in subsequent years to
paying a small amount of profits as officer compensation or shifting to another
entity in order to attempt to continue evading wage taxes would appear badges
of (at least civil) tax fraud7~ for which there is no statute of limitations.
70 Schwidetsky, supra note 68 at n.271 (In these cases, the courts often focused on distributed earnings, and typically
most or all of the earnings were distributed. Distribution should not change the analysis. If the S corporation
earnings are indeed best classified as compensation to the shareholder-employees, whether or not they are
distributed in a given year should not change the answer.").
71 CP 261, Sample Contents ofNotice ofAcceptance as an S-Corporation, available at http://www.irs.gov/
individuals/article/0"id=128518,00.html ("We would also like to take this opportunity to inform you of your tax
obligations related to the payment of compensation to shareholder-employees of S Corporations. When a
shareholder-employee of an S Corporation provides services to the S Corporation, reasonable compensation
generally needs to be paid. This compensation is subject to employment taxes. Tax practitioners and Subchapter S
Shareholders need to be aware that revenue ruling 74-44 states that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will recharacterize small business corporation dividends paid to shareholders as salary when such dividends are paid to the
shareholders in lieu of reasonable compensation for services. The IRS may also re-characterize distributions other
than dividend distributions as salary. This position has been supported in several recent court decisions"). See
generally James A. Fellows & John F. Jewell, S corporations and salary payments to shareholders: a major issue
for the IRS; corporate taxation, 76 [New York State] CPA Journal 46 (May 2006).
72 Form 1120S line 7 calls for entering the total compensation of all officers paid or incurred in the trade or business
activities of the corporation...
73 Fred R. Esser, P.C. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 421 (D Ariz. 1990)(Scorporation loaned attorney shareholder
money on weekly basis and at year end "paid" dividend equal to net taxable income which shareholder left in
corporation to pay back loans he received during the year; "employer should not be permitted to evade FICA and
FUTA by characterizing all of an employee's remuneration as something other than 'wages. "'), citing Joseph
Radtke, S.c. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143, 146 (E.D. Wis. I 989X''where the corporation's only director had the
corporation pay himself, the only significant employee, no salary for substantial services -- ... Mr. Radtke's
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TIGTA Russell George, however, in the 2005 Senate Finance Committee
Hearings on "Social Security: Achieving Sustainable Solvency" questioned
whether "education" was the issue as to under compensation of S corporation
officers to evade wage taxes. 74
ii. A more bold alternative administrative technique would be to send to high
business income, no officer compensation, single shareholder-controlled S
corporations a Correspondence Audit (letter) requesting information as to
identity of officers; services performed by officers and/or controlling
shareholder; identification of primary generators of the S corporation's business
income; and amounts of distributions to officer-shareholders in any form (e.g.,
dividends, loans, withdrawals, royalties or rents). Then if such Correspondence
Audits are ignored (as probably half will be), IRS should send to the taxpayer
deficiency notices or notices of employee status determination75 and amounts of
wage taxes due on the assumption that all business profits (or any distributions)
constitute wages for services.
111. Additionally any return preparers of more than some floor number of 1040S
returns for such identified S corporations 76 should also be sent similar warning .
letters with the additional warnings of adding and abetting tax fraud; and
'dividends' were in fact 'wages' subject to FICA and FUTA taxation. His 'dividends' functioned as remuneration
for employment. ...... An employer should not be permitted to evade FICA and FUTA by characterizing all of an
employee's remuneration as something other than 'wages. "')(emphasis supplied), affd, 895 F.2d 1196 (7 th Cir.
1990).
74
2005 Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 10 at 39. See also TIGTA, WHILE EXAMINATIONS OF HIGHINCOME T AXPA YERS HAVE INCREASED, THE IMPACT ON COMPLIANCE MAY BE LIMITED 2 (200630-105 Jui. 25,2006); TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, SIGNIFICANT
CHALLENGES EXIST IN DETERMINING WHETHER TAXP AYERS WITH SCHEDULE C LOSSES ARE
ENGAGED IN TAX ABUSE (2007-30-173 Sept. 7, 2007)(First, IRS issued on its web site a "Factsheet" reminding
taxpayers in filling out schedule C to follow appropriate guidelines when determining whether an activity is a
business or a hobby (an activity not engaged in for profit). When that didn't work, SB/SE in Ii 2005 research project
sent out letters to individuals with potentially tax-abusive home-based "businesses" claiming Schedule C losses.
While some taxpayers filed amended returns, the overall response rate was low (around 50 percent as in the 2006
TIGTA report as to 2004); SB/SE concluded that sending letters was not effective. In 2003 in limited testing SB/SE
undertook Correspondence Audits of potential hobby loss returns. Out of 148 returns SB/SE disallowed the
Schedule C losses as hobby losses of 103 or 69.6 percent. IRS collected the assessed increase in taxes from 92
percent of the taxpayers with disallowed losses. This looked like success, but TIGTA reviewed the accounts of the
taxpayers with the disallowed losses for the years 2002-05 and found 51 percent continued to claim Schedule C
losses from the activities in succeeding years after the 2002 tax year returns filed in 2003. Based on these test
results, IRS "believes working the hobby loss issue through correspondence examination is not productive because
the multiple contacts with taxpayers increased the amount of time needed to complete the examinations." TIGTA
determined that the universe of taxpayers who potentially avoid taxes by deducting hobby losses (Schedule C losses
for 2002 through 2005) for 2005 was 1,483,246 taxpayers, many with significant income from other sources;
1,076,796 (73%) of these individuals had their tax returns prepared by tax practitioners. Based on their Tax Year
2005 income levels, TIGTA estimated that 1,203,175 of that universe of taxpayers potentially avoided paying $2.8
billion in income taxes).
7S Whether the Service must issue a Notice of Determination of Worker Classification (NDWC) and provide the
taxpayer with written notice of the provisions of Section 530 before commencing such an audit of an S corporation
and a controlling officer performing more than minor services, receiving a distribution in any form and reporting no
officer compensation is a contentious issue ..
76 YKI Link Analysis Tool Extracts data from an Oracle database that contains selected information from the
Individual and Business Master File Returns Transaction Files. The application uses partnership data to show how
gains and losses flow through and across all related entities
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egregious cases should be referred to the Office of Professional Responsibility
for sanctioning. 77 This initiative should be widely publicized.

Unofficial Transcript is Available of IRS Hearing on Practice Standards for Tax Return Preparation, 2010 TNT
197-23 (Oct. 13,2010)( preamble to the proposed regulations notes that the standards in section 1O.34(a) with
respect to tax returns are being reproposed to provide broader guidelines that are more appropriate for professional
ethic standards with a particular focus on tax shelters. A "tax shelter" is defined by reference. to §6662(d)(2)(C)(ii),
which describes a tax shelter as a partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan
or arrangement if a "significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion
offederal income tax. ").
77

28

